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1.

INTRODUCTION

In October 2001, General Electric Company ("GE"), the largest
corporation in the world and the number one producer of jet engines, announced the largest industrial merger in history. GE

Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") Jack Welch stated that GE would
acquire Honeywell, the largest worldwide supplier of non-engine

aerospace equipment. Welch ventured that there would be no antitrust problems; the proposed merger would be conglomerate, not
horizontal. The merger would merely bring together complementary products that were component parts of large jet aircraft.'
On May 2, 2001, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department

of Justice cleared the merger after requiring a small spin-off of
overlapping helicopter businesses. 2 On July 3, 2001, the European

Commission prohibited the merger, finding it incompatible with
the common market 3
* Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University
School of Law. The Author thanks Merit Janow for her helpful comments. The
Author is grateful for the support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of the New York University School of Law.
' See Antitrust: MergerMuddle, EcoNoMIsr, June 23,2001, at 11 (discussing the
size of the GE/Honeywell merger).
2 Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2,
2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8140.htm.
3 Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell v. Commission (2001)
[hereinafter GE/Honeywell], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf, appeal pending, Action Brought on 12
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The GE/Honeywell saga symbolizes the problems that confront a world in which markets are global, but law is national or
regional.
This Essay addresses the problems and challenges posed by the
incompatibility of national law with global markets. First, examining the GE/Honeywell merger, the Essay investigates why the
European Union ("EU") concluded that the merger was anticompetitive, while the United States deemed the merger procompetitive. Second, the Essay considers solutions to the problem of international mergers without a body of international competition law.
2.

SETTING THE STAGE

Competition law regulates the competition process and helps
make markets function effectively while protecting the integrity of
the market. More than ninety countries and regions have competition laws, and, of those, approximately sixty-five have merger
4
control regimes.
Predictably, different jurisdictions have somewhat divergent
approaches in applying their competition laws; such laws are elements of political economy. U.S. antitrust law once embraced the
goals of diversity, freedom from coercion, and economic opportunity for market players who lacked power.5 Beginning in 1981,
there was a paradigm change: antitrust intervention became inappropriate unless the proposed conduct or transaction threatened to
lower output and thus raise prices. 6 Based on the assumption that
markets and business decisions are usually efficient, or at least

September 2001 by the General Electric Company against the Commission, 2001
O.J. (C 331) 24.
4 See Statement of Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition, and Business and
Consumer Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, 8 (2002) ("There are now nearly
100 national and regional antitrust regimes in the international arena, with
roughly 65 of those requiring some form of premerger notification."), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/200233.htrn; U.N. TDBOR, Directory of Competition Authorities at 3, U.N. Doe. TD/B/COM.2/CLP/27 (listing
the contact information for competition authorities in countries around the
world), at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp27.en.pdf.
5 See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust- Retrospective and
Prospective:Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
936, 944 (1987) (discussing the history and original goals of early antitrust regulation).
6 Id. at 945.
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more efficient than antitrust intervention, this "consumer welfare"
model is regarded as a proxy to achieve efficiency. 7
EU competition law is an integral part of the founding treaty of
the European Community. The Treaty of Rome was intended to
achieve one common market and the cohesion of the Member
States by, among other things, enabling the free flow of goods,
services, capital, and people, as well as preventing distortions of
competition that stack the playing field.8 Abuses of dominance are
distortions of competition. Adopted only in 1989, merger control
prohibits mergers that create or entrench dominance. European
competition law accounts for a merger's effects on all players, induding market actors and consumers, and exempts distorting
agreements that are productive and efficient if consumers benefit
from the combination's gains. 9
U.S. and EU models tend to produce common outcomes. Both
proscribe cartels and mergers of competitors that produce cartellike behavior, as well as conduct or merger structures that are directly exploitative of consumers. However, in the area of singlefirm exclusionary practices and the creation of market structures
that facilitate them, the two systems are largely incompatible. Exclusionary practices foreclose market actors by exercises of power.
They distort the playing field. Consumers find it more difficult to
obtain the products and services of the fenced-out firms. However,
even in the face of exclusionary practices, prices do not necessarily
rise. There are scenarios in which a dominant firm may adopt
practices that exclude competitors, but output may increase and
prices may fall. For example, a firm that imposes a tie-in may
achieve economies of scope, or it may increase its own output
merely by charging each buyer what that buyer is willing to pay.
Moreover, a dominant producer of complementary products tends
to charge a lower total price than the sum of the prices charged by
two separate dominant producers of each of the complementary
products. This effect captures the producer's incentive to avoid
double marginalization.10 Therefore, the law of a jurisdiction that
7 Id. at 957.
8 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct 2,

1997,1997 O.J. (C340) 1.

9 ELEANOR Fox, THE COMPETION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, CASES AND
MATERIALS (forthcoming 2002).
10 See United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division Submission for

OECD Roundtable on Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers (Oct 12,2001) at
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considers the distorting effect of uses of leverage to be anticompetitive will be more prohibitory than the law of a jurisdiction that
mandates abstention in the absence of a probable rise in prices.
This was the fault line in GE/Honeywell.
3.

THE GE/HONEYWELL MERGER

GE is the world's largest producer of large and small jet engines for commercial and military aircraft. GE and its joint venture, GE Capital Aviation Services ("GECAS"), account for more
than fifty-two percent of all engines in large commercial jets still in
production. GE accounts for sixty to seventy percent of engines in
large regional aircraft in production, forty to fifty percent of engines in the installed bases of large regional aircraft and ten to
twenty percent (in both categories) of engines for corporate jets.
The engine market is highly concentrated; Pratt & Whitney and
Rolls-Royce are the world's second- and third- largest producers,
respectively." GECAS is one of the world's largest aircraft leasing
companies and one of the largest buyers of airplanes. GECAS purchases about ten percent of all aircraft; along with its sister corporation, GE Capital, GECAS finances the purchase of airplanes and
is an important airplane launch customer. GECAS provides equity
seed financing to buyers of smaller planes that use GE engines,
creating "commonality" considerations that encourage airlines to
select similar equipment in the future, whether or not buyers have
acquired future planes from GECAS. Once an aircraft manufacturer chooses to incorporate a particular supplier's engine and
other elements, it tends to continue purchasing the same brand because of significant efficiencies such as the acquired knowledge,
training, and the ability to use parts across a fleet. In the past, GE
made known its policy to buy only aircraft that incorporated GE
12
engines.
Honeywell is a leading producer of aerospace products, including navigation equipment, non-avionic products, engines for
corporate jets, and engine starters. Honeywell accounts for fifty to
sixty percent of avionic products generally (although this is not a
15-16, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/susocp.htm.
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 521-22 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the "Chicago arguments" that monopolies piled on top of one another produce lower, not higher, prices).
11 GE/Honeywell, supra note 3, paras. 84-88.
12 Id. paras. 122-33.
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single relevant market). It also accounts for sixty to seventy percent of engines installed in medium-sized corporate jets in production. For aerospace equipment other than engines, Honeywell is
the largest worldwide supplier, with BF Goodrich ranking second,
United Technologies Corporation ("UTC") third, and Rockwell
Collins fourth. UTC is Honeywell's principal competitor in the
market for non-avionic products. Honeywell is the only equipment manufacturer that offers a complete range of avionics equipment. It is the leading supplier of engine controls to engine manufacturers, particularly engine starters. Although Pratt & Whitney
does make engine starters, the starters are for the company's own
use.13
GE and Honeywell agreed to merge. They filed their merger
notifications with the relevant U.S. authorities, who cleared the
deal after requiring a spin-off of competitively overlapping engine
assets. The parties also filed their merger notification with the
European Commission, which expressed the following concerns:
(1) Eliminating competition. The merger would create a horizontal overlap in engines for large regional jets and corporate and
small regional jets, strengthening GE's dominant position.14
(2) Bundling. The merged firm, having a large line of complementary products including products in which it was dominant or
near-dominant, would have the incentive to engage in mixedproduct bundling. Reflecting advantages of economic integration,
including the enormous financial resources of GE Capital, the
merged company would probably lower the price of the bundle
while raising the stand-alone price of the products sold. The competitors, which would face higher costs of capital, would be unable
to lower their prices to the same extent. Although they would reduce prices somewhat, they would lose market share and the profits necessary to invest in research and development, which would
eventually lead to market exit or to the termination of key market
segments. Then, the merged firm would raise its prices, creating or
strengthening a dominant position in the manufacture of jet aircraft engines and in avionics and non-avionics products. 15

13 Id. paras. 84-88, 241-43, 276.
14 See Press Release, European Commission, The Commission Prohibits GE's

Acquisition of Honeywell (July 3, 2001) (summarizing the Commission's reasons
for rejecting the merger), at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi
/guesten.ksh?reslist.
15 Id.
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(3) Vertical foreclosure of competing engine manufacturers.
Honeywell is an important supplier of engine controls, such as
starters, to engine manufacturers. Honeywell would have had the
potential to delay or disrupt the supply of engine controls, or to increase rivals' costs, strengthening GE's dominant position in en-

gines.16

(4) Reciprocity17 (using leverage to induce one's suppliers to
become loyal customers), foreclosing avionics and non-avionics
manufacturers from substantial business they would otherwise
have won on their merits. GE Capital provides extensive financial
support to its potential customers, the aircraft makers, and uses its

and GE's financial power to procure exclusive supply positions for
its products. GECAS uses its buying and launching platform leverage to encourage aircraft makers to shift business to GE. After
the merger, Honeywell's products would similarly benefit from
this financial strength, buying power, and leverage. Since airlines
are relatively indifferent to component selection, they would
probably shift purchases of avionic and non-avionic products to

GE. Competitors would be progressively marginalized and might
exit the market, creating a dominant position in avionic and non-

avionic products for the merged firm.
On the facts, the Commission rejected the merging parties'
claims that they lacked dominance, that they would not have
power to impose bundling or use leverage, that their customers
would not accept bundling, that there would be no crosssubsidization, and that competitors could outcompete the incumbent supplier by offering counter-bundles or would leapfrog GE by
introducing technological improvements to their products.' 8
Given prior EU case law, the fact-finding and the European allocation of burdens, the merger would probably have run afoul of
the legal standard even without proof that the merger would lead
to price increases. However, after the European Commission's
concerns became public and during the period of the European investigation, Americans sharply criticized the Commission's bundling theory. Invoking Cournot, Americans stated that the merger
would cause prices to fall.19 Thereafter, the European authorities
16

Id.

This word is not used in the decision.
18 GE/Honeywell, supranote 3, para. 70.
19 See GE/Honeywell: Welch Squelched, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2001, at 61 (explaining American criticisms of the EU's decision).
17
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stressed the reciprocity-power scenario (GE would leverage its
power over engines and financing to cause aircraft makers to buy
its avionics), and predicted that in the medium term the merger
would degrade the competitive structure of the market and prices
would rise.20 This prong of the analysis would play a prominent
role in the Commission's decision to prohibit the merger.
When the Commission issued its decision, U.S. Assistant Attorney General in Charge of Antitrust Charles James immediately
issued a press release expressing his disagreement with the European Commission's analysis and conclusions. James declared that
U.S. law protects consumers while the European Commission
The attorney then stated that
protects competitors. 21
GE/Honeywell would engage in bundling, an efficiencypromoting activity; therefore, the Commission's decision to prohibit the merger was inefficient. The Commission prohibited the
merger because GE would have become too effective a competitor.
European Commissioner Monti responded to James's press release
with an eloquent presentation denying his charges. 22
In the aftermath of the decision, both sides softened their rhetoric. The United States continued to maintain that the Antitrust Division analyzed the merger in the only right way.23 European offi20 See Press Release, European Commission, Commissioner Monti Dismisses
Criticism of G.E.-Honeywell Merger Review and Rejects Politicisation of the Case
(June 18, 2001) [hereinafter Monti Dismisses Criticism] (arguing that the merger
would result in a "dominant" market position), at http://www.europa.eu.int
/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt-gt&doclP/01/855 101 AGED&lg
=EN&display=. See also Welch squelched, supra note 17, at 61 (noting the Comnssion's shift in rhetoric after widespread criticism of the bundling theory to a more
general view that the merged firm would "simply be too influential in the aircraftengines and systems businesses").
21 Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Statement by Assistant
Attorney General Charles A. James on the EU's Decision Regarding the
GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr
/2001/July/303ahtm. See also Charles A. James, Reconciling Divergent Enforcement Policies: Where Do We Go From Here?, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INsrTUTE 1 (B. Hawk ed., 2002) (highlighting the differences between U.S. and EU merger control regimes).
22 Monti Dismisses Criticism, supranote 18, at 1 ("I deplore attempts to misinform the public and to trigger public intervention.., this is a matter of law and
economics, not politics.").
23 See William Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long
Way from Chicago to Brussels, Address before the George Mason University
Symposium (Nov. 9,2001) (noting a sharp divergence between U.S. and European
merger clearance standards), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches
/9536.htm.
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cials defended their analysis within the U.S. paradigm, apparently
preferring to join the issue on grounds of economics rather than on
grounds of the wider European view of "harm to competition."
Defenders of the decision assert that the Commission proved the
merger may have raised prices over a longer term.24 Officials on
both sides of the ocean vowed to work more closely together on
the harmonization of competition law, and reaffirmed their view
that closer cooperation would avert inconsistent outcomes in the
future.
Skeptics might question both the stance of the American
authorities (the merger would be efficient) and the stance of the
European authorities (the merger would cause prices to rise). One
might view the Americans' conclusion-that the merger was pricelowering and therefore efficient and pro-competitive-as a neat
trick. Their conclusion was based on the Cournot effect of bringing
monopoly ownership of complements under joint control. If premerger GE were dominant in engines, which the U.S. authorities
denied, and if Honeywell were dominant in avionics, which neither U.S. nor European authorities believed, then GE and Honeywell each would have been charging a supracompetitive price before the merger. A merged GE/Honeywell would have avoided
double marginalization, stopping its own two-stage supracompetitive pricing in order to increase profits. If the theory was that
Honeywell was not dominant pre-merger but that the merger
would make it dominant (which, again, the Americans did not believe), then the argument would be that there was no need to fear
that the merger would create dominance, because the combination
would create incentives to curb the exploitative power that dominance confers.
In fact, despite the fact that neither GE nor Honeywell offered
proof of such promised efficiencies, 25 both American and European
24 See G6tz Drauz, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate
Mergers Under EC Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 885 (2002) (asserting that
the GE/Honeywell merger would allow GE to increase market share while progressively marginalizing competitors' positions).
25 Under European law, after the Commission demonstrated that the merger
created or enhanced dominance, GE/Honeywell had the burden to demonstrate
that the merger was efficient. Neither GE nor Honeywell argued that it was efficient. Moreover, it appears that GE CEO Jack Welch eventually decided that the
merger was not efficient for GE. The merger no longer made economic sense, for
Honeywell's economic prospects had deteriorated and the negotiated purchase
price was high. Perhaps as a result, Welch failed to offer the conditions that the
Commission signaled would be acceptable. Press reports indicated that Welch
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authorities asserted that GE/Honeywell would lower its prices after the merger. The United States and the European Union simply
came to different conclusions. The United States argued that the
lower prices would trigger more competition; European authorities
insisted that the merger would be price-raisingafter a siege of low
pricing. They argued that prices would rise not in the short-term,
but in the medium-term, as the competitive structure of the market
weakened and the less advantaged competitors disengaged from
the sectors in which GE/Honeywell had preferential access to
customers. Normally, it is difficult to predict a medium-term price
rise in the aftermath of low pricing. Low-price competition normally triggers competitive responses from rivals. An analysis of
the many variables in play would usually moderate a prediction
that low prices would squeeze out or divert all significant competitors, rather than toughen them up; barriers would keep out
entrants in the face of a later rise in prices, even if such a scenario
were possible under special circumstances. 26
After the initial conflict, the warring authorities regained their
optimistic cooperative stance. Future dashes would be rare, they
said. The world needs convergence, and the trend-line towards
convergence is strong. A major case decided by the European
Court of First Instance ("CFI") in the summer of 2002 reinforced
the trend line. The Commission had decided to prohibit the
merger of British holiday packagers Airtours and First Choice on
grounds that the remaining firms in the market would gain "collective dominance." The CFI annulled the decision on grounds
that the Commission had not proved that the rivals would change
their behavior to act collectively (in a cartel-like fashion). The
market conditions necessary to facilitate collective action were not
present. 27 Airtours effectively raised the standard of proof facing
the Commission by subjecting the Commission's economic factfinding to intense scrutiny. Airtours, however, does not concern
itself with the possible exclusionary or foreclosing effects of a
was content to walk away from the deal. Welch squelched, supra note 17, at 61
(stating that "Mr. Welch made remarks that killed any scope for further negotiation.").
26 See Robert J. Reynolds & Janusz A. Ordover, Archimedean Leveraging and the
GE/Honeywell Transaction,70 ANTrrausT L.J. 171 (2002) (arguing that the necessary
conditions for a medium-term price increase were present in the GE/Honeywell
case).
27 Case T-342/99, Airtours Plc. v. Commission (2002), available at
http://curia.eu.int/common/recdoc/indexaz/en/t2.htm.
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merger, which remains a subject of greater divergence among national systems.
4.

WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?

The gaps and overlaps that stem from application of national
laws to mergers in global markets are evident. Policymakers tend
to pose one of two alternative questions as their starting point
when considering solutions to the problems with today's system:
(1) What tools of resolution are at our fingertips?, or (2) How can

we bring competition law in line with global markets and make the
world trade-and-competition system more rational and seamless?
Those who ask the first question would observe that networks
of cooperation have formed, and they are growing. Bilateral networks do exist. U.S.-EU cooperation is prime among such networks. Cooperation in the analysis of particular mergers of common interest is particularly strong, with staff consulting regularly.
Meetings of the Competition Law Committee and Global Competition Forum of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the newly formed International Competition Network (ICN), strengthen the effort. The networks, and
the communications and alliances they spawn, drive the law towards greater convergence.
Moreover, the law on extraterritorial jurisdiction has sufficiently converged so that it is possible for nations, with some claim
of legitimacy, to catch and reprehend conduct and transactions that
occur beyond their borders but have significant effects within the
territory.
Will horizontal (nation-to-nation) networks and legitimate extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction substantially solve the problems of applying national law to transactions in a global world? Is
GE/Honeyzvell the rare exception or the significant example?
GE/Honeywell is exemplary of systemic problems that are of significant dimension, even while competition authorities are sure to exercise restraint before allowing another public confrontation.
Neither cooperation nor isolationism can provide sufficient and legitimate answers.
First, in matters of exclusionary practices, there is a perceptible
gap between the conceptual underpinnings of the laws of different
nations. These foundations may shift from time to time, but not
always in the same direction at the same time.
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Second, national authorities and courts consider only the benefits and harms within their own borders; nations act nationalistically. Although antitrust authorities are relatively well-motivated
and well-trained to apply principles of national treatment and nondiscrimination, this applies to inbound commerce, not outbound
harms. One may wonder if it is mere coincidence when a nation's
antitrust decisions align with the nation's political interests. For
example, a national government might support a merger between
its nationals, as the United States did in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas.28 When a merger of foreign nationals would create a firm that
threatens to outcompete the jurisdiction's champion (e.g., a yet
larger Boeing competing against Airbus Industrie), is it, again,
mere coincidence when Europe's competition policy and its industrial policy align?29 Even if such circumstances arose out of
mere coincidence, the conflict of interest erodes the grounds for
trust.30 There is need for an impartial decision-maker, in appearance as well as fact.
Third, there is an increasingly pressing need for a party with a
perspective that can encompass a whole problem. National level is
the wrong level from which to judge an international merger. If
neither Ohio nor New Jersey were the appropriate level at which to
conceptualize and challenge Standard Oil's conduct and acquisitions in the United States in the early 1900s,31 and if neither France,
Italy, nor Germany would have been the suitable level at which to
conceptualize and approve or prohibit the ATR-de Havilland acquisition in the early 1990s, 32 then neither the United States nor the
European Union is at the best level (or jurisdiction) to permit or
prohibit a Boeing/McDonnell Douglas or a GE/Honeywell.
Global markets demand globally-conceptualized law.
This conclusion invites the question: How can we bring competition law into line with the true breadth of markets?

Boeing Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,295 Uuly 1,1997).
29 Case IV/M.877, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas v. Commission, 1997 OJ. (L
28

336) 16.
30

See Editorial, Wh Asked Europe?, WASH. PosT, July 24, 1997, at A20 (dis-

cussing merger interference by the United States and other countries).
31 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (applying the
Sherman Act).
32 See Case IV/M.053, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland v. Commission,
1991 O.J. (L 334) 42, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. M2 (blocking a proposed merger between
French and Italian companies with a Canadian division of Boeing).
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The challenge is a difficult one-difficult politically, because
nations see a loss of sovereignty when law is taken out of their
hands; difficult practically, because there is the need to formulate a
principle of law and a method of enforcement or surveillance.
However, the obstacles to international merger regulation are not
insurmountable. If higher or more cosmopolitan law makes sense,
the law will find its appropriate level, just as U.S. law did in 1890
and European law in 1957. This does not mean that we must move
to a federal world. The European measure known as a framework
directive is a helpful model. 33 According to the model, nations
might agree to a framework for addressing global market problems. The agreement can specify general principles: for example,
no anticompetitive mergers with significant negative external effects, subject to possible transparent and proportional derogation.
It can be left to the participating jurisdictions to meet the objectives
of the framework measure by formulating and making transparent
a national rule and applying their national rule to the whole geographic market unbounded by artificial borders.
Thus, if jurisdictions agree to a multilateral principle against
anticompetitive mergers, an enforcing jurisdiction, applying its
own formulation to an international merger, could be required to
adopt and enforce measures carrying out the principle and in doing so to take account of all market harms, including those beyond
its territorial borders. Extraterritoriality would thus become a twoway street with a cosmopolitan dimension. Not only could a nation challenge acts abroad that hurt its citizens, but it could also
protect those abroad hurt by its citizens. If national authorities
cannot accept this mantle of cosmopolitanism (and ultimately perhaps even if they can, for the conflict of interest problem is not
cured), then a world-level panel for judicial resolution of clashing
national decisions may be the necessary next step.
World-level antitrust is a vision for the future; it will not come
tomorrow. However, the mind that takes seriously the problems
exemplified by GE/Honeywell and the limits of national laws
when applied to global transactions is led ineluctably in this direction.

33 See G. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 75-76,

572 (2d ed. 2002) (exploring a new method through which a smaller number of
directives are adopted as frameworks).
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